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1. Introduction 
There is a growing body of literature investigating to what extent female and male legislators differ 
from one another, and what explains when and why any such differences arise. To date, much of 
this scholarship concentrates on legislator behaviour inside parliament. It evaluates whether female 
legislators have different policy preferences than their male counterparts, are successful in 
implementing ‘women-friendly’ or ‘female’ policies, or affect the size and composition of public 
expenditures (for reviews, see Wängnerud, 2009; Ashworth et al., 2012). At a more behavioural 
level, this literature also assesses whether female and male politicians diverge in terms of 
presentation and speech style, collaboration with colleagues, or in other respects inside the political 
arena (Thomas, 1994; Childs, 2004). 
In contrast, this paper focuses on legislator behaviour outside the parliament: namely, the outside 
interests of members of parliament (MPs). Although a matter of public and political debate in many 
countries, outside interests have been largely neglected thus far in the sex-differences literature 
discussed above.1 Indeed, while several studies have observed that in the national parliaments of 
Germany and Italy as well as in U.S. state legislatures female MPs on average have fewer outside 
jobs (Maddox, 2004; Mause, 2009) and/or lower outside income (Becker et al., 2009; Gagliarducci 
et al., 2010) than their male colleagues, no studies exist, to the best of our knowledge, that 
investigate this finding further.2 Yet, such findings clearly raise more questions than they answer: 
Why do female MPs show fewer extra-parliamentary activities in the considered samples? What are 
the sources and consequences of such divergence? 
In this article, our main contribution therefore lies in using a sample of 614 members of the 
German national parliament (Deutscher Bundestag) in its 16th legislative term between 2005-09 
(32.1% of MPs are female) to explicitly focus on potential determinants of sex differences in MPs’ 
outside jobs. More specifically, we exploit insights from the sociological, politico-economic and 
social-psychological literatures on sex/gender differences to investigate the potential mediating role 
of, for instance, parenthood, partisanship, political capital, job typology, and so on. Are sex 
differences in legislator ‘moonlighting’ restricted to specific types of outside jobs? For example, are 
female MPs less likely to have private-sector functions (such as supervisory board posts)? Or are 
political and public-sector organisations more ‘women-friendly’ suppliers of outside jobs? Does 
parenthood or party affiliation play a role in this context? What is the importance of MPs’ political 
1 Following these literatures, the term ‘sex’ is used below to refer to the binary categorisation (female vs. male) 
according to biological attributes, while ‘gender’ is used in contexts where feminine or masculine roles, characteristics, 
behaviour or values are attributed by society to the sexes. 
2 Earlier work on, for example, physicians’ or public school teachers’ moonlighting likewise indicates clear sex 
differences (Culler and Bazzoli, 1985; Dolado and Felgueroso, 2008; Winters, 2010). 
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experience in obtaining extra-parliamentary functions, and does such political capital affect female 
and male MPs in the same way? 
The importance of such questions from a broader societal perspective is evident. If, for instance, 
female legislators with children have fewer outside jobs than male MPs, this could be interpreted as 
another sign that it is difficult for women inside the political business to ‘have it all’ (McKay, 
2011). Moreover, it is well-known that serving several competing principals (voters, parties, interest 
groups, etc.) may cause serious time and coordination problems for MPs (Carey, 2007; Geys and 
Mause, 2012). Being a ‘mother-MP’ caring for one or more ‘baby-principals’, for instance, could 
make it difficult/impossible to work for one or more outside employers – especially in a 
conservative environment with traditional gender roles. Likewise, observing that women MPs are 
less frequently on the boards of private business firms may be a symptom of another type of sex 
discrimination – or a signal that female legislators have a different professional ethics (e.g. avoid 
conflicts of interest) than their male colleagues. In short, what is interesting here is that sex might 
matter even at the ‘top of society’s hierarchy’; that is, in a recruitment pool of (potential) 
moonlighters that ‘have already eliminated potential distractions’ from sex and/or gender effects 
(Hansson, 2011, p. 309). 
Clearly, however, while answering the above questions increases our understanding of sex-based 
inequities in politicians’ outside interests, providing hard evidence for or against several tentative 
explanations for observed sex differences – e.g. discrimination, differences in risk aversion, labour 
market conditions, and so on – remains intricate as our analysis relies on official, quantitative data 
and should be complemented by qualitative methods (e.g. interviews, surveys, experiments) in the 
future (we return to this below). Hence, our analysis of the German national parliament is best seen 
as a first step to shed light into an area of political behaviour where the (potential) importance of 
sex has thus far not been systematically analysed. As such, we hope it will stimulate further studies 
exploring this issue in other (sub)national parliaments.  
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 exploits a rich social science literature to derive 
testable predictions regarding sex differences in politicians’ moonlighting behaviour. Then, sections 
3, 4 and 5 describe the dataset employed, our empirical strategy and the regression results, 
respectively. Finally, Section 6 discusses our main findings and avenues for further research. 
 
2. Why Women May Differ: Theories and Hypotheses 
Following the literature on moonlighting or ‘multiple job holding’ in the general population, we 
analyse politicians’ observed moonlighting behaviour as the equilibrium outcome of a labour 
market. On one side of this market, there are firms or organisations seeking ‘employees’ that best 
match their desired profile and performance expectations. On the other side of the market, there are 
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politicians deciding whether or not to accept sideline offers, or actively putting themselves forward 
for such jobs. As long as there are no legal incompatibility rules, members of parliament will 
thereby be guided by constraints from their personal situation (e.g. family, income), professional 
circumstances (e.g. conflicts of interest), and the jobs’ characteristics (e.g. remuneration, 
intellectual challenge, time-investment, future career possibilities). However, why might one expect 
sex-related differences in this particular labour market? 
 
Why Women May Differ: Gender Stereotypes, Multi-Income Households & Risk Aversion 
One classic argument regarding the importance of sex in labour markets concerns gender 
stereotypes leading to a glass ceiling, thereby impeding the advance of women. The underlying idea 
is that recruiters have ‘gendered’ expectations concerning the performance, ability or ‘fit’ of job 
candidates. For leadership positions (as the ones analysed below), such expectations are often to the 
disadvantage of women, thereby creating a preference for male candidates (Heilman, 1995; Watts, 
2009). Even though MPs have overcome an important selection barrier by getting elected, such 
stereotypes might still impede the further (post-election) development of female MPs (McKay, 
2004). 
Another set of arguments focuses on the supply-side of the labour market. First, gender 
stereotypes have important self-fulfilling effects (Harris and Rosenthal, 1985). Hence, they not only 
affect recruiters, but, through socialisation effects, also female applicants. These might then become 
less likely to accept, or apply for, sideline positions. Second, married women in parliament are 
mostly from two-income families, while male MPs (especially in conservative parties) are more 
likely to be part of male breadwinner/female caregiver families (Berardo et al., 1987). 
Consequently, there is less need for the female MP to take on extra work to increase family income. 
Finally, women on average are more risk-averse than men (Borghans et al., 2008). They may thus 
perceive the political risk (i.e. Election Day retribution by the public; Geys, 2012) related to real or 
perceived conflicts of interest involved in outside activities differently. Although difficult to 
disentangle empirically (see below), these various arguments lead to a first conjecture: Female MPs 
are, compared to male MPs, less likely to have many sideline jobs (H1a). 
 
Labour Market Conditions 
An important contextual factor to account for is that, notwithstanding the constitutionally defined 
principle of ‘sexual equality’ in many Western countries, there might de facto still be unequal 
opportunities for female and male MPs. Note, for instance, that the German private sector is still 
intensely male-dominated; women fill less than 2.5% of all executive board positions in Germany’s 
top-200 largest non-financial corporations (Holst and Wiemer, 2010) – compared to between 7.6% 
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and 21.9% female board members in the largest Spanish, Australian, Hong Kong, British, Danish, 
American, Canadian, Finnish and Swedish companies (Mahtani et al., 2009; Sealy et al., 2009). 
This under-representation is much less dramatic for public-sector functions due to ‘sexual equality’ 
policies in public-sector organisations (no legally binding gender-quota exist in Germany for 
private-sector firms). In fact, looking at the 80,000 biggest German companies in 2004, Holst 
(2006) shows that the share of females in top and middle management positions in public 
authorities and associations (e.g. unions or employers’ associations) is approximately twice that in 
private-sector companies (i.e. 16% versus 8.2%). Hence, ‘old-boy networks’ – which often have 
significant effects on hiring processes and outcomes (Saloner, 1985; McDonald et al., 2009) – may 
constitute an especially resilient barrier for women when it comes to private-sector sideline jobs. 
This suggests a further specification of the hypothesis formulated above: The relation described 
under H1a is most pronounced for private-sector functions (H1b). 
 
Overcoming Disadvantage through Experience 
Experimental analyses have shown that women are held – by both male and female judges – to 
higher confirmatory standards (i.e. standards indicating a candidate has the ability to perform a 
given task); they thus require a higher skill level to convince judges they have the ability to perform 
the job (Biernat and Fuegen, 2001). This evidence confirms predictions about ‘double standards for 
competence’ derived from expectation states theory (Foschi, 2000), which argues that ‘performance 
by members of lower status groups (e.g. women) [is] assessed by stricter standards than similar 
performance by members of higher status groups (e.g. men)’ (Lyness and Heilman, 2006, p. 779). 
Such gendered differences in standards for diagnosing competence imply that women have to work 
harder to achieve promotions, jobs, or levels of authority (Kramer and Lambert, 2001; Lyness and 
Heilman, 2006). In other words, to overcome their initial disadvantage, it is ‘in women’s interest to 
introduce additional job-relevant information (Ridgeway, 1997, p. 227) and show ‘greater evidence 
of competence’ (Lyness and Heilman, 2006, p. 779).  
To the extent that such arguments hold equally for female MPs, this suggests that evidence of 
individual abilities is likely to be more important for women than men to prove their value – both to 
outside employers and themselves (to overcome the self-fulfilling effects discussed above). In the 
setting under investigation, such evidence can most directly derive from relevant professional 
experience (i.e. more terms in office, which generates knowledge of political processes as well as 
social and contact networks). This leads to our second hypothesis: More extensive political 
experience is more important for female than male MPs in obtaining sideline activities (H2). 
 
Family Orientation: Motherhood and Children 
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The design of the welfare state in a country is likely to affect MPs’ opportunities for pursuing extra-
parliamentary activities. For example, Germany’s conservative welfare state (Esping-Andersen, 
1990) still institutionally promotes male breadwinners and female caregivers, which ‘strongly 
impact[s] the gendered distributions of divisions of private and public work responsibilities’ 
(Hansson, 2011, p. 310).3 For instance, Holst and Busch (2010) find that in 2007 over 90% of 
German mothers with a full-time leadership position spent at least one hour per working-day on 
childcare vis-à-vis 72% of their male counterparts. Translated to our setting, this suggests that 
female MPs with a family may be more constrained to take up additional outside activities – 
especially when the MP’s children are young.4 
Interestingly, a similar conclusion may be drawn from experimental studies showing that 
mechanical ability and leadership skills are often associated with men, while domestic skills tend to 
be reserved for women (Heilman et al., 1989). These associations underpin expectations that 
women are more likely care for family and children, and that family is a ‘greater priority for women 
than career advancement’ (Kramer and Lambert, 2001, p. 113). Survey evidence is often supportive 
of such trend: a recent German study, for instance, shows that 84% of women have ‘family’ as top 
priority in their life vis-à-vis 68% of men, while 11% of men and 5% of women give ‘work’ top 
priority (Allensbach Institute, 2010, p. 37). This perceived (and/or actual) family-orientation of 
women may matter at both the demand- and supply-side of the labour market. On the demand-side, 
it is ‘often viewed by promotional decision makers as lacking loyalty and commitment’ (Kramer 
and Lambert, 2001, p. 113), and thereby reduces women’s promotion potential. On the supply-side, 
it might leave politician-mothers more reluctant than politician-fathers to take up outside jobs. 
Moreover, while the above-mentioned effects are mostly based on perceptions, motherhood itself 
has recently also been shown to carry a penalty in terms of recruitment and wages (Budig and 
England, 2001; Correll et al., 2007). 
Finally, at the supply-side of the market for outside engagements, the number of children (rather 
than mere parenthood) may also play a role. ‘Reflecting the greater budgetary needs of larger 
families’, an increasing number of children might increase demand for and/or acceptance of 
ancillary activities (Kimmel and Conway, 1996, p. 7; see also Allen, 1998; Dickey et al., 2011). 
Moreover, given that the demand for high-quality – and thus high-cost – education and lifestyle for 
one’s children generally increases with income (Becker and Tomes, 1976), this effect is likely to 
3 The introduction of ‘parental leave benefit’ (Elterngeld) in January 2007 (i.e. up to 67% of pre-birth income for up to 
14 months) – intended to stimulate fathers’ participation in childcare (Spiess and Wrohlich, 2008) – does not affect our 
setting as members of the German Bundestag are excluded from this transfer. 
4 In Germany, female Bundestag members have a right to a 14-week maternity leave (Mutterschutz) around childbirth. 
Note also that mother-MPs might face a low financial threshold to delegate childcare to professional childcare services: 
they receive a basic remuneration of 7009 Euro per month and could, in theory, also use their 3503 Euro (per month) 
blanket allowance for expenses to this effect (2007 figures). 
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occur even when politicians’ inside income is high. This yields our third hypothesis: Parenthood 
constrains sideline activities of female politicians, but may increase men’s. The number of children 
enhances outside activities (H3). 
 
Partisan Affiliation 
Finally, not only the conservative nature of the German welfare state might affect MPs’ 
opportunities for pursuing extra-parliamentary activities. The same may hold for political parties’ 
ideologies with respect to women. Conservative, parties (e.g. the German Christian-Democratic 
CDU/CSU) can be expected to be the repository of traditional beliefs in terms of women’s and 
men’s roles with respect to the family. On the other hand, left-leaning parties (e.g. SPD and Greens 
in Germany) tend to have an ideology stating that men and women are equal. As politicians tend to 
self-select into parties, MPs in these respective parties may thus have diverging opinions with 
respect to sideline jobs – as well as whether such jobs can be combined with ones family life. This 
suggests that the effect of parenthood/children is likely to be particularly strong for conservative 
politicians. This leads to our fourth and final hypothesis: The relation described under H3 is most 
pronounced for MPs in conservative parties (H4). 
 
3. Institutional Background and Data 
Members of the German national parliament are legally allowed to moonlight, but are obliged to 
report all professional activities pursued in addition to their political mandate that fall into the 
following categories (Bundestag, 2007): (1) “paid activities in addition to the mandate” (e.g. lawyer 
or management consultant); (2) “member of the management, supervisory, administrative, advisory 
or other board in a private enterprise”; (3) similar activities “in local authorities [e.g. city/county 
council] or public corporations” (e.g. public broadcasting company or regulatory agency); (4) 
similar activities “in clubs, associations and foundations which are not solely of local significance”; 
(5) “agreements on future activities or pecuniary advantages”; (6) “investments in business 
companies” (if MP has a voting share of more than 25%).5 
New disclosure rules detailing these categories came into effect in October 2005 (thus setting the 
start of our sample period). The declared sideline activities were published for the first time on 17 
September 2007 in the Official Handbook of the German Bundestag (Bundestag, 2007), and have 
been continuously updated on the Bundestag website since then. We employ the print version of the 
5 Furthermore, for each sideline job, MPs are obliged to report ancillary income exceeding 1,000 Euro (gross) per 
month or 10,000 Euro (gross) per year. However, these revenues are only published in three income levels: 1,000-3,500 
Euro; 3,500-7,000 Euro; above 7,000 Euro. Moreover, MPs are free to indicate whether they reach a given income level 
on a monthly or yearly basis. Clearly, this significantly obscures actual income generated. Hence, we do not employ 
income data in the analysis (see Rosenson, 2007, for a similar decision on similarly reported US data). 
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data since these had a uniform due date for all MPs. This provides us with information on the 
moonlighting activities of all 614 Bundestag members in the period 10/2005 to 09/2007 (197 
women and 417 men). 
The total number of ancillary activities for each MP is counted as the sum of activities in 
categories (1) through (4) and (6). Category (5) is excluded as we are interested in MPs’ current 
sideline activities (though only one MP declares an activity on this category). To address the variety 
in ancillary activities and empirically test H1b, we separate activities in the private sector of the 
economy from those in the public and political sector. The former is measured by the sum of 
ancillary activities in categories (2) and (6), and adding activities from category (1) when the data 
indicate that the activity is performed in the private sector (e.g. management consultant). As a proxy 
for sideline activities in the public sector, the sum of non-political (see below) ancillary activities in 
categories (1), (3) and (4) is taken. Finally, we measure jobs in the political sector by calculating the 
number of political sideline jobs in category (3) (e.g. city/county councillor).6 Although this official 
data source has also been utilised in Becker et al. (2009), Mause (2009), and Niessen and Ruenzi 
(2010), none of these studies examines the role of politicians’ sex in detail, nor differentiates 
between different types of sideline activities. 
 
FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE 
 
Figure 1 presents the data. The number of MPs is given on the vertical axis, the number of 
sideline jobs on the horizontal axis. The distribution for the overall number of sideline jobs is 
represented by the black cubes, while the distributions for sideline jobs in the private, public and 
political sectors are given by the dotted, striped and light-grey cubes, respectively. Figure 1 reveals 
that 12.1 % of the 614 members of the German Bundestag (= 74 MPs) have no sideline activities 
requiring publication, while a few parliamentarians exhibit a large number of ancillary activities (up 
to a maximum of 24 activities). The figure also illustrates that sideline jobs are most common in the 
public sector. 
Before proceeding with the analysis, however, it should be noted that the number of outside 
interests is clearly an imperfect measure of MPs extra-parliamentary activities. It does not account 
for activities’ relevance to MPs’ constituency (which may be considered part of the legislator’s job 
description), it does not allow estimating the true workload of politicians involved in these jobs, and 
6 We exclude the few political jobs under category (1) – i.e. minister and secretary of state – from our measurement of 
sideline activities. These are different in nature from the local political jobs in category (3), but are too few in number to 
warrant independent analysis. We will, however, control for the possible effect of holding such positions on the 
remaining sideline activities (more details below). 
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it does not reflect the level of remuneration involved in the activities (see also Geys and Mause, 
2013). Although it is the best indicator available in the German setting, these limitations should be 
kept in mind throughout the ensuing analysis.  
 
4. Empirical Strategy 
To explore whether sex matters for MPs’ moonlighting activities, we estimate a multiple regression 
model of the following form (with subscript i referring to MPs): 
 i
k
iijiii ZSEXSEXXY εβββα ++++= ∑
=
6
3
21 )*( ,  (1) 
where Yi reflects our four dependent variables: namely, total number of ancillary activities, as 
well as ancillary activities in the private, public and political sector (as depicted in Figure 1). Xi is a 
set of control variables describing the characteristics of MPi’s political mandate (i.e. party 
affiliation, party-list vs. direct mandate, home federal state, number of legislative periods attended), 
whether MPi holds an important political office (i.e. minister, secretary of state, leader of his/her 
parliamentary fraction, committee leadership or (vice-)president of the Bundestag), and his/her 
socio-demographic characteristics (age, marital status, number of children, religious affiliation, 
occupational background).7 Summary statistics for all variables are provided in Table A1 in 
Appendix A, separated by sex. 
Our central independent variable of interest is SEXi, an indicator variable equal to 1 for female 
MPs, 0 for males. Following H1a and H1b, we expect that β2<0, particularly for private-sector 
functions, as such a negative coefficient estimate would indicate that female MPs have fewer 
(private-sector) outside activities compared to male MPs. Then, to test H2 and H3, we introduce 
interaction terms between SEXi and two background characteristics (contained in Zi, which is a 
subset of Xi): i.e. number of legislative periods attended (TERMSi), and number of children 
(CHILDRENi). Such interactions allow us to evaluate whether, and how, parliamentary experience 
and children play a different role for men and women. As we have directional hypotheses 
concerning these interaction effects, we evaluate them using one-tailed significance tests.  
Before discussing the results, four more technical notes are required. First, based on H3, one 
could argue for the inclusion of both the number of children and a parenthood dummy (1=at least 
one child, 0=otherwise; summary statistics for this dummy are also presented in Table A1). As 
doing so does not affect our main findings and never gives statistically significant results for the 
7 These controls exhaust all information available in official data sources. More detailed information (such as the age of 
MPs’ children, MPs’ ‘true’ civic status and pre-parliamentary job details, or the professional status of their partner) is, 
unfortunately, unavailable. Note also that we only explicitly control for training in economics/business, law and 
education/teaching. The reason is that these professional groups are ‘over-represented’ in our sample, and remaining 
professional-educational backgrounds are very diverse. 
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parenthood dummy, we opted for a more parsimonious model including only the number of 
children. The same holds for preliminary tests evaluating the presence of non-linearities in the 
children effect (unlike in e.g. Budig and England, 2001), such that we retain our linear specification 
(details available upon request). Second, as we lack more detailed information on the age of 
children, we experimented with the following rule-of-thumb to create a three-way distinction that 
approximates children’s age: MPs under 40 have young children, MPs between 40-50 have children 
at school-going age, MPs over 50 have children that are independent of their parents. The age-limits 
were chosen to account for the fact that highly-educated individuals usually start having children 
later in life (Heck et al., 1997). 
Third, since our dependent variables only take non-negative integer values, and have a highly 
skewed distribution, standard linear regression techniques (i.e. OLS) are inappropriate. Moreover, 
tests for overdispersion indicate that the dependent variables’ variance is significantly higher than 
their mean (p<0.01 in all cases), implying that the Poisson distribution is likewise inappropriate. 
Hence, a negative binomial count model is employed to estimate equation (1). Finally, as a 
robustness check – and to evaluate whether the limited number of politicians with very many 
sideline positions affect our findings – we replicated all regressions using a set of scale variables 
(0=MP has no sideline jobs; 1=MP has one to three such jobs; 2=MP has more than three sideline 
jobs) as the dependent variables. The results – obtained using ordered logit regressions – are 
qualitatively similar, indicating that the heavily skewed distribution of our dependent variables is 
not driving our results (details upon request). 
 
5. Empirical Results 
Table 1 displays our results. Columns (1) through (4) contain results for the overall sex effect, while 
Columns (5) through (8) also include the interaction effects between MPs’ sex and background 
characteristics. In both cases, we report results for the total number of outside jobs (Columns 1 and 
5), the amount of private-sector (2 and 6), public-sector (3 and 7) and political jobs (4 and 8). With 
respect to the interpretation of the regression coefficients, it is important to highlight that in such 
interaction models the coefficient of an ‘un-interacted’ background variable (TERMSi, 
CHILDRENi, etc.) refers to its effect under the situation that SEXi=0. Hence, it represents the effect 
for men. The effects for women equal the coefficient of the un-interacted variable (e.g. 
CHILDRENi) plus the coefficient of the ‘interacted’ variable (e.g. SEXi*CHILDRENi). The 
coefficient on the interaction-variable itself (e.g. SEXi*CHILDRENi) indicates to what extent 
women differ from men. Note also that for ease of interpretation of these interaction effects, we 
provide a graphical representation thereof for the main results discussed below. 
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TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
 
Column (1) of Table 1 reveals that, controlling for all factors contained in Xi (see above), women 
on average hold fewer sideline jobs than men. This is in line with H1a and confirms earlier work on, 
for example, physicians (Culler and Bazzoli, 1985; Dolado and Felgueroso, 2008) or public school 
teachers (Winters, 2010). It also reflects a general pattern in the broader society (Paxson and 
Sicherman, 1996; Averett, 2001), although women are catching up with men since the 1970s 
(Kimmel, 1995; Averett, 2001). Interestingly, however, Columns (2) to (4) show that this effect is 
completely due to female MPs’ lower number of sideline jobs in the private sector. That is, while 
sex has a strong and statistically significant negative relation on the number of MPs’ sideline 
activities in the private sector, its relation with the number of ancillary positions in the public and 
political sectors remains insignificant. This is in line with H1b, and suggests that male-domination 
of the private sector, the absence of legal gender quotas for private-sector firms, and female-
advancement programs in the public sector have important effects also when it comes to female 
MPs’ sideline activities. Still, as the official moonlighting data do not allow disentangling whether 
female MPs are less likely to be offered – or pursue – certain positions in the private sector, or are 
more likely to reject them when offered, care should be taken in interpreting these results as an 
indication of, for instance, discrimination or self-selection. We return to this in the conclusion. 
 
Political Experience 
Our findings also provide supportive evidence with respect to H2. In Columns (5) and (6), the 
interaction term between the number of parliamentary terms – our proxy for political experience – 
and the sex dummy (1=female) is positively signed and statistically significant at conventional 
levels when analysing MPs’ overall and private-sector sideline activities. The graphical illustration 
of these sex-differentiated effects of parliamentary experience in the two top panels of Figure 2A 
further clarifies this finding. In both cases, the marginal effect of an additional term in office is 
statistically insignificant for men (shown on the left-hand side of either panel where SEXi=0), but is 
statistically significant for women (shown on the right-hand side of either panel where SEXi=1). 
Both findings indicate that even for women near the political top of German society, greater 
evidence of political experience remains important in the market for private-sector extra-
parliamentary positions. Still, as illustrated by the bottom-left panel of Figure 2A, a similar effect 
does not arise for public-sector jobs, since both men and women hereby benefit from more political 
experience. 
 
FIGURE 2A ABOUT HERE 
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It is important to stress here that the findings for parliamentary experience cannot simply be 
explained by the higher average age of more experienced parliamentarians. To control for this, we 
added an interaction term between SEXi and MPs’ age (AGEi) to the model. This shows that for 
private-sector sideline jobs, age has a statistically significant positive effect for men, but a negative 
(though insignificant) effect for women (see the top-right panel of Figure 2B for a graphical 
illustration). This suggests that while age might well be an asset for men in the ‘hunt’ for private-
sector sideline jobs, it tends to be significantly less valuable for women. While there is little 
empirical research exploring the interactive effects of age and sex in the labour market,8 our results 
are in line with experimental evidence showing that managers/employers perceive women to ‘reach 
their peak’ at a younger age than men (Itzin and Phillipson, 1995). This places older women at a 
comparative disadvantage in the job market. 
 
FIGURE 2B ABOUT HERE 
 
However, under the (possibly overly restrictive) assumption that employers view the hiring of 
politicians as a way to cultivate long-term relationships with politicians (see Snyder, 1992, for 
evidence that long-term considerations are central to interest groups’ campaign contribution 
decisions), our results might also represent a generational effect. Indeed, given the historical over-
representation of men in the German Bundestag, older female members of the current Bundestag 
may simply not have been MP at the age when recruitment for outside positions would then mainly 
occur. If so, the age effect we observe should disappear in the future as later generations of female 
MPs continue to hold their earlier-acquired outside positions (see Maume, 2004, for a similar 
argumentation on wage inequality). 
 
Children and Partisanship 
Finally, we turn to the effect of MPs’ children. For the total number of sideline jobs, we find that 
more children are associated with significantly more outside jobs for men, but have no significant 
effect for women (see Column 5 in Table 1, and the top-left panel of Figure 2C for a graphical 
illustration). The same basic relation shows up in Columns (6) and (7), but not for political jobs in 
Column (8); see also the remaining panels of Figure 2C. These results imply that while men appear 
8 We know of only one such study. Using a sample of 318 movie stars over the period, 1926-1999, Lincoln and Allen 
(2004, p. 623) show that older female actors are ‘disadvantaged both in terms of number of film roles and in terms of 
average star presence [i.e. importance in the movie as judged by the rank in the film’s credits], compared to older male 
actors’. 
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to have more private-sector outside jobs when they have children, women do not (at least not 
significantly so). Interestingly, similar findings have been observed for American and Spanish 
physicians in Culler and Bazzoli (1985) and Dolado and Felgueroso (2008), among male-only 
samples of American employees (Shishko and Rostker, 1976; Kimmel and Conway, 1996; Conway 
and Kimmel, 1998) and among UK offshore oil and gas workers (Dickey et al., 2011).9 
 
FIGURE 2C ABOUT HERE 
 
For the interpretation of this finding, it is important to remember that our final model does not 
include a parenthood dummy (1=at least one child, 0=otherwise), since the results for the latter were 
both insignificant and did not affect our main findings (see above). Taking into account such 
insignificant results for the parenthood variable, however, it becomes clear that it is not simply 
having children (yes/no), but having many children that is associated with an increase in male MPs’ 
number of outside jobs. A plausible explanation could be that father-MPs with many children need 
more (outside) income to satisfy the family’s financial needs (Kimmel and Conway, 1996; Allen, 
1998; Dickey et al., 2011). While such statement implicitly rests on the stereotypic assumption that 
father-MPs live according to the traditional male breadwinner/female caregiver family model, 
Germany’s conservative welfare-state model makes this a likely event. Alternatively, traditional 
gender roles may simply provide a stronger counterweight on women than men to the need to 
generate more income. 
 
TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE 
 
Table 1 implicitly assumes that the same effects hold for young and older children, which, as 
noted earlier, may not be realistic. To evaluate whether young children place particularly strong 
demand on parents (and female MPs in particular, see H3), Table 2 employs the aforementioned 
three-way distinction between ‘young’, ‘school-age’ and ‘older’ children using MPs’ age as an 
approximation. The results – given in Columns (9) through (12) in Table 2 – show that more 
children in any age group increases the overall number of sideline jobs for men, and this effect is 
mainly driven by private- and public-sector jobs (political jobs remain unaffected by the number of 
children). The effect on women is often much weaker (as shown by the negative interaction effects 
9 Averett (2001) – using data from the US Current Population Survey – finds that having children age six and older 
significantly increases the probability of moonlighting of both mothers and fathers. Another interesting related finding 
presented by Gustafson (2006, p. 513) is that having children ‘reduces the [work-related] travel activity of women, 
whereas there is no consistent such effect among men’. 
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in Column 9), but generally remains positive. The major exception occurs with respect to the 
number of private-sector sideline activities of female MPs with young children (Column 10). A 
higher number of young children substantially reduces the number of sideline jobs for women 
(0.306-0.914 = -0.608; Chi²=1.76; p=0.18), but significantly increases it for men (0.306; p<0.01). 
Having young children thus appears to disproportionately affect women, but only for a specific 
subsample of sideline activities (viz. private-sector functions). 
In Columns (13) through (20), we replicate the same regressions using only politicians from the 
conservative Christian Democrats (CDU/CSU, Columns 13-16) or the Social Democrats (SPD, 
Columns 17-20) to take a closer look at hypothesis H4. While the sample-sizes here occasionally 
get quite small, it appears that the ‘young-mothers effect’ described above is largely driven by 
CDU/CSU politicians. In fact, none of the four female CDU/CSU MPs with young children hold 
sideline jobs in the private sector, whereas 57% of their male colleagues in the same familial 
position (N=14) do have such jobs. Female SPD-MPs with young children do not differ 
significantly from the male counterparts (see Column 18). More generally, it appears that 
significant interaction effects predominantly appear in the CDU/CSU subsample, and are rare in the 
SPD subsample. This suggests – in line with hypothesis H4 – that the effect of parenthood/children 
is especially prevalent among politicians in conservative parties with traditional beliefs regarding 
women’s and men’s family roles. 
 
6. Conclusion and Outlook 
Using a large sample of German MPs and controlling for a large set of background 
characteristics, this article has shown that sex matters with respect to a type of legislator behaviour 
that has been neglected thus far in the literature analysing whether female legislators are different: 
MPs’ extra-parliamentary activities. Given that ‘sexual equality’ is a constitutionally defined 
principle in Germany (as well as many other Western countries), this is a remarkable result. 
Moreover, one should keep in mind that we considered individuals at the ‘top of society’s 
hierarchy’ which arguably ‘already eliminated potential distractions’ from sex and/or gender effects 
(Hansson, 2011, p. 309) and which – prima facie – made our sample a rather unlikely case for 
finding structural effects. Furthermore, as gender-equality standards in Germany are enforced more 
strongly for public-sector than private-sector organisations, the private/public/political differences 
in our findings suggest that implementing and, especially, enforcing policies to create sexual 
equality can bear fruit. 
However, while our quantitative empirical analysis of 197 female and 417 male German MPs 
used the available individual-level data on observable/measurable factors such as partisanship, 
political experience, parenthood, number of children, and type of outside job, more detailed 
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information is required to address a number of ensuing issues concerning the sources of divergence 
in extra-parliamentary activities across female and male legislators. 
Is the fact that female MPs on average hold fewer sideline jobs in the private-sector than their 
male counterparts influenced by sex/gender discrimination, employers’ pro-male bias, or ‘old-boy 
networks’? Or are women simply less likely than men to seek out and/or accept offers of (especially 
private-sector) sideline activities because they are more risk averse (e.g. to avoid potential electoral 
risks or conflicts of interest associated with outside jobs), more conscientious about parliamentary 
work,10 or more time-constrained (e.g. for family reasons or due to higher involvement in outside 
activities that do not require reporting)? To disentangle these possibilities, future work should 
collect information – for example, via personal interviews or questionnaires – of participants at both 
sides of the studied labour market (in terms of application behaviour, job offering, 
acceptance/rejection decisions, time for outside activities, and so on). Rather than focus on the 
market outcome (i.e. MPs’ observed outside positions), this would provide a possibility to look 
more directly into the labour market process itself. 
10 A more direct evaluation of such sex-differences in MPs’ ‘quality’ would entail analysing information on e.g. 
attendance rates, roll-call votes, or written enquiries. While attendance rates are not published by the German Bundestag 
and are hard to come by, collecting information on MP-quality measures seems a worthwhile endeavour in future work. 
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Figure 2A: Graphical Illustration of Sex-Terms Interaction Effect 
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Figure 2B: Graphical Illustration of Sex-Age Interaction Effect 
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Figure 2C: Graphical Illustration of Sex-Children Interaction Effect 
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Table 1: Regression Results: Sex and MPs’ Sideline Activities 
Variable All outside 
jobs 
(1) 
Private-
sector 
(2) 
Public-
sector 
(3) 
Political 
jobs 
(4) 
All outside 
jobs 
(5) 
Private-
sector 
(6) 
Public-
sector 
(7) 
Political 
jobs 
(8) 
SEX 
(1=female) 
-0.128 * 
(-1.59) 
-0.762 *** 
(-5.10) 
0.076 
(0.77) 
0.120 
(0.70) 
0.321 
(0.85) 
0.105 
(0.14) 
0.161 
(0.36) 
0.142 
(0.18) 
TERMS 
(terms in parliament) 
0.046 *** 
(2.14) 
0.013 
(0.36) 
0.081 *** 
(3.02) 
-0.160 *** 
(-2.66) 
0.026* 
(1.06) 
-0.017 
(-0.45) 
0.071 *** 
(2.22) 
-0.156 *** 
(-2.38) 
AGE 
(years) 
-0.001 
(-0.17) 
0.017 *** 
(2.26) 
-0.006 
(-1.07) 
-0.027 *** 
(-2.94) 
0.003 
(0.53) 
0.022 *** 
(2.57) 
-0.005 
(-0.75) 
-0.026 *** 
(-2.42) 
CHILDREN 
(number of children) 
0.076 *** 
(2.70) 
0.144 *** 
(2.95) 
0.052 * 
(1.45) 
0.087 
(1.31) 
0.085 *** 
(2.76) 
0.158 *** 
(2.98) 
0.064 * 
(1.56) 
0.037 
(0.52) 
SEX * TERMS - - - - 0.098 *** 
(1.98) 
0.210 *** 
(2.58) 
0.050 
(0.83) 
-0.001 
(-0.01) 
SEX * AGE 
 
- - - - -0.014 * 
(-1.56) 
-0.028 * 
(1.55) 
-0.003 
(-0.31) 
-0.007 
(-0.35) 
SEX * CHILDREN - - - - -0.039 
(-0.64) 
-0.071 
(-0.52) 
-0.050 
(-0.64) 
0.201 * 
(1.50) 
CDU/CSU (reference category) 
SPD -0.307 *** 
(-3.61) 
-0.799 *** 
(-4.96) 
-0.187 * 
(-1.82) 
-0.117 
(-0.60) 
-0.308 *** 
(-3.62) 
-0.819 *** 
(-5.13) 
-0.185 * 
(-1.80) 
-0.114 
(-0.59) 
FDP -0.026 
(-0.20) 
-0.253 
(-1.36) 
0.046 
(0.28) 
-0.270 
(-0.85) 
-0.030 
(-0.24) 
-0.263 
(-1.41) 
0.045 
(0.27) 
-0.269 
(-0.84) 
Green Party -0.119 
(-0.71) 
-1.176 *** 
(-3.98) 
0.229 
(1.19) 
-0.900 *** 
(-2.02) 
-0.131 
(-0.78) 
-1.188 *** 
(-3.97) 
0.221 
(1.15) 
-0.881 *** 
(-2.01) 
Left Party -0.683 *** 
(-3.50) 
-0.912 *** 
(-3.23) 
-0.640 *** 
(-2.27) 
-0.924 *** 
(-2.13) 
-0.690 *** 
(-3.53) 
-0.921 *** 
(-3.26) 
-0.635 *** 
(-2.24) 
-0.898 *** 
(-2.06) 
Independent MP -0.447 *** 
(-2.26) 
-0.940 
(-1.35) 
-0.790 
(-1.25) 
0.618 
(1.26) 
-0.490 *** 
(-2.46) 
-1.001 
(-1.43) 
-0.824 
(-1.32) 
0.689 
(1.27) 
Minister 0.102 
(0.73) 
-0.901 *** 
(-2.31) 
0.066 
(0.34) 
-1.232 
(-1.40) 
0.091 
(0.65) 
-0.925 *** 
(-2.44) 
0.044 
(0.22) 
-1.137 
(-1.31) 
Secretary of state 0.220 ** 
(1.67) 
-0.272 
(-0.99) 
0.211 
(1.24) 
-15.862 *** 
(-65.22) 
0.214 * 
(1.60) 
-0.287 
(-1.08) 
0.210 
(1.22) 
-14.766 *** 
(-59.61) 
Member party fraction 
leadership 
-0.020 
(-0.13) 
-0.056 
(-0.25) 
0.074 
(0.46) 
-0.423 
(-0.86) 
-0.036 
(-0.23) 
-0.074 
(-0.33) 
0.064 
(0.40) 
-0.440 
(-0.87) 
Leader party fraction 0.479 *** 
(2.44) 
0.530 * 
(1.58) 
0.569 ** 
(1.92) 
0.069 
(0.14) 
0.477 *** 
(2.50) 
0.513 * 
(1.53) 
0.559 ** 
(1.90) 
0.103 
(0.21) 
Leader committee 0.105 * 
(1.49) 
0.183 * 
(1.61) 
0.140 ** 
(1.76) 
-0.290 
(-0.89) 
0.096 
(1.37) 
0.166 * 
(1.45) 
0.136 ** 
(1.70) 
-0.296 
(-0.93) 
Substitute leader committee 0.160 * 
(1.60) 
-0.143 
(-0.68) 
0.292 *** 
(2.79) 
0.077 
(0.32) 
0.179 ** 
(1.76) 
-0.117 
(-0.56) 
0.308 *** 
(2.88) 
0.045 
(0.19) 
Vice-president Bundestag 0.671 *** -0.662 ** 0.862 *** -15.119 *** 0.666 *** -0.623 * 0.866 *** -14.072 *** 
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(2.54) (-1.70) (3.07) (-32.21) (2.43) (-1.54) (3.01) (-28.05) 
Mandate 
(1=constituency-based MP) 
0.076 
(0.99) 
-0.064 
(-0.46) 
0.165 ** 
(1.76) 
0.059 
(0.33) 
0.072 
(0.92) 
-0.068 
(-0.50) 
0.158 ** 
(1.67) 
0.074 
(0.41) 
East 
(1=East-German MP) 
-0.243 *** 
(-2.48) 
-0.321 ** 
(-1.87) 
-0.313 *** 
(-2.31) 
0.285 * 
(1.54) 
-0.249 *** 
(-2.55) 
-0.329 ** 
(-1.88) 
-0.312 *** 
(-2.32) 
0.284 * 
(1.53) 
Married 
(1=yes) 
-0.131 * 
(-1.53) 
-0.108 
(-0.74) 
-0.146 * 
(-1.43) 
-0.135 
(-0.73) 
-0.131 * 
(-1.53) 
-0.109 
(-0.75) 
-0.147 * 
(-1.43) 
-0.131 
(-0.72) 
Other Background (reference category) 
Economics background 0.070 
(0.71) 
0.166 
(1.03) 
-0.004 
(-0.03) 
0.152 
(0.77) 
0.088 
(0.89) 
0.187 
(1.17) 
-0.007 
(-0.06) 
0.148 
(0.75) 
Legal background -0.027 
(-0.32) 
0.122 
(0.88) 
-0.115 
(-1.10) 
0.091  
(0.48) 
-0.022 
(-0.27) 
0.125 
(0.91) 
-0.113 
(-1.08) 
0.093  
(0.50) 
Teacher background -0.095 
(-0.86) 
-0.516 *** 
(-2.17) 
0.001 
(0.00) 
0.305 
(1.00) 
-0.103 
(-0.93) 
-0.530 *** 
(-2.25) 
0.003 
(0.02) 
0.295 
(0.97) 
Atheist/No religion (reference category) 
Catholic 0.013 
(0.13) 
-0.568 *** 
(-3.20) 
0.128 
(1.01) 
0.526 *** 
(2.05) 
0.012 
(0.11) 
-0.574 *** 
(-3.27) 
0.130 
(1.02) 
0.552 *** 
(2.13) 
Protestant 0.183 *** 
(2.05) 
-0.241 * 
(-1.46) 
0.313 *** 
(2.87) 
0.390 ** 
(1.84) 
0.187 *** 
(2.10) 
-0.239 * 
(-1.46) 
0.317 *** 
(2.90) 
0.386 ** 
(1.83) 
Intercept 1.328 *** 
(5.99) 
-0.020 
(-0.05) 
0.791 *** 
(2.94) 
0.202 
(0.43) 
1.202 *** 
(4.90) 
-0.177 
(-0.44) 
0.757 *** 
(2.53) 
0.182 
(0.35) 
Log pseudolikelihood 
Wald Chi² (R) 
-1458.94 
113.60 *** 
-838.87 
156.23 *** 
-1239.49 
73.11 *** 
-380.45 
6984.55 *** 
-1456.48 
119.46 *** 
-835.90 
163.29 *** 
-1238.92 
76.20 *** 
-379.36 
5928.02 *** 
Notes: N=614; t-values based on robust standard errors between brackets: *** significant at 1%, ** at 5%, * at 10% (one-tailed). Wald-test indicates joint 
significance of all regressors (with R equal to the number of regressors minus one). 
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Table 2: Regression Results: Children and Partisan Effects Reconsidered 
Variable All outside 
jobs 
(9) 
Private-
sector 
(10) 
Public-
sector 
(11) 
Political 
jobs 
(12) 
All outside 
jobs 
(13) 
Private-
sector 
(14) 
Public-
sector 
(15) 
Political 
jobs 
(16) 
All outside 
jobs 
(17) 
Private-
sector 
(18) 
Public-
sector 
(19) 
Political 
jobs 
(20) 
 ALL ALL ALL ALL CDU/CSU CDU/CSU CDU/CSU CDU/CSU SPD SPD SPD SPD 
SEX 
(1=female) 
0.319 
(0.75) 
0.844 
(0.99) 
0.090 
(0.18) 
0.401 
(0.43) 
0.467 
(0.61) 
0.906 
(0.55) 
0.380 
(0.52) 
1.173 
(0.86) 
0.438 
(0.50) 
1.998 
(1.24) 
-0.372 
(-0.34) 
-0.616 
(-0.35) 
YOUNG CHILDREN 
(number of children) 
0.184 *** 
(3.02) 
0.306 ** 
(1.89) 
0.170 *** 
(2.14) 
0.050 
(0.36) 
0.113 
(1.34) 
-0.086 
(0.59) 
0.216 *** 
(2.31) 
-0.034 
(-0.17) 
0.237 *** 
(2.27) 
0.586 ** 
(3.09) 
0.013 
(0.07) 
0.112 
(0.51) 
SCHOOLAGE 
CHILDREN 
(number of children) 
0.077 ** 
(1.81) 
0.127 ** 
(1.76) 
0.075 * 
(1.49) 
-0.037 
(-0.37) 
0.139 *** 
(2.60) 
0.187 *** 
(2.20) 
0.133 *** 
(2.39) 
-0.143 
(-0.92) 
0.046 
(0.48) 
-0.049  
(-0.28) 
0.120 
(1.06) 
-0.215 
(-1.07) 
OLDER CHILDREN 
(number of children) 
0.070 ** 
(1.92) 
0.139 *** 
(2.65) 
0.041 
(0.78) 
0.076 
(0.87) 
0.125 *** 
(2.61) 
0.107 * 
(1.49) 
0.149 
(2.48) 
0.008 
(0.08) 
-0.057 
(-0.91) 
0.092  
(0.85) 
-0.090 
(-1.03) 
-0.366 
(-1.16) 
SEX * YOUNG 
CHILDREN 
-0.072 
(-0.50) 
-0.914 ** 
(-1.89) 
0.030 
(0.16) 
-0.406 
(-0.73) 
0.155 
(0.90) 
-20.138 *** 
(-25.51) 
0.248 
(1.33) 
-14.669 *** 
(-17.70) 
-0.466 ** 
(-1.77) 
-0.607 
(-0.88) 
-0.445 
(-0.54) 
0.247 
(0.32) 
SEX * SCHOOLAGE 
CHILDREN 
-0.007 
(-0.08) 
-0.030 
(-0.18) 
-0.050 
(-0.53) 
0.310 *** 
(2.14) 
-0.218 * 
(-1.55) 
-0.222 
(-0.77) 
-0.263 ** 
(-1.69) 
0.202 
(0.60) 
-0.011 
(-0.08) 
-0.471 
(-1.40) 
-0.058 
(-0.33) 
0.368 * 
(1.53) 
SEX * OLDER 
CHILDREN 
-0.059 
(-0.77) 
0.003 
(0.02) 
-0.071 
(-0.69) 
0.165 
(0.83) 
-0.114 
(-1.13) 
0.039 
(0.16) 
-0.219 * 
(-1.61) 
0.281 * 
(1.47) 
0.098 
(0.83) 
0.072 
(0.24) 
0.105 
(0.75) 
0.174 
(0.40) 
Intercept 1.034 *** 
(3.66) 
-0.375 
(-0.78) 
0.525 * 
(1.45) 
0.335 
(0.58) 
1.543 *** 
(3.15) 
0.105 
(0.14) 
1.332 *** 
(2.23) 
-0.181 
(-0.26) 
-.148 *** 
(-0.30) 
-2.442 *** 
(-2.71) 
-0.420 *** 
(-0.67) 
0.082 
(0.07) 
Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Log pseudolikelihood 
Wald Chi² (R) 
N 
-1454.87 
124.39 *** 
614 
-833.64 
174.43 *** 
614 
-1237.39 
87.73 *** 
614 
-377.91 
5682.58 *** 
614 
-565.93 
89.24 *** 
225 
-372.25 
1267.89 *** 
225 
-474.03 
212.16 *** 
225 
-157.79 
3248.18 *** 
225 
-495.60 
79.88 *** 
222 
-241.13 
821.25 *** 
222 
-428.82 
54.76 *** 
222 
-125.80 
3316.50 *** 
222 
Notes: t-values based on robust standard errors between brackets: *** significant at 1%, ** at 5%, * at 10% (one-tailed). Wald-test indicates joint significance of all regressors (with R equal to the number 
of regressors minus one). All controls as in Table 1 included throughout, as well as the interactions SEX*AGE and SEX*TERMS. 
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Appendix A 
 
Table A1: Summary statistics central variables, by sex 
 All 
outside 
jobs 
Private-
sector 
jobs 
Public-
sector 
jobs 
Political 
jobs 
Terms 
in office 
Children 
(Number) 
Children 
(Dummy) Age 
Overall 
(N=614) 
4.047 
(3.592) 
[0—24] 
1.156 
(1.840) 
[0—14] 
2.531 
(2.731) 
[0—24] 
0.293 
(0.570) 
[0—3] 
2.951 
(1.851) 
[1—10] 
1.531 
(1.362) 
[0—6] 
0.676 
(0.468) 
[0—1] 
49.393 
(9.644) 
[22—73] 
Men 
(N=417) 
4.374 
(3.825) 
[0—24] 
1.470 
(2.075) 
[0—14] 
2.542 
(2.821) 
[0—24] 
0.297 
(0.582) 
[0—3] 
3.048 
(1.999) 
[1—10] 
1.691 
(1.420) 
[0—6] 
0.700 
(0.459) 
[0—1] 
49.988 
(9.985) 
[25—73] 
Women 
(N=197) 
3.355 
(2.929) 
[0—16] 
0.492 
(0.896) 
[0—5] 
2.508 
(2.537) 
[0—13] 
0.284 
(0.544) 
[0—2] 
2.746 
(1.473) 
[1—10] 
1.193 
(1.162) 
[0—5] 
0.624 
(0.486) 
[0—1] 
48.132 
(8.772) 
[22—69] 
Men=Women 3.633 *** 8.147 *** 0.151 0.272 2.102 ** 4.603 *** 1.840 * 2.239 ** 
Notes: Entries represent mean value across politicians in a given group, the associated standard deviation (between brackets) 
and the range from minimum to maximum [in square brackets]. ‘Men=Women’ is the significance level (i.e. t-value) 
of a difference-in-means t-test allowing for unequal variance across samples. It reflects how likely it is that both 
means are exactly the same, given their underlying distribution. 
